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ABSTRACT 
This thesis describes an analysis of the reliability of 
the Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement (MTVR) cargo variant 
in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), from March 1, 2004 to 
March 31, 2007. More than 870 MTVRs were fielded by the 
Marine Corps for OIF, of which 456 provided data for 
analysis. Analysis and modeling of this repairable system's 
failure modes are conducted at the MTVR variant, major unit, 
armored status, and subsystem levels to develop an 
understanding of the vehicle's usage and performance under 
field conditions. Reliability is measured by the frequency 
of occurrence of unscheduled maintenance events, with the 
number of days that a vehicle is not available due to these 
events ("deadlined days") used as a measure of severity. The 
challenges of using field maintenance and supply data are 
handled using various methods, including data verification, 
failure event aggregation, and odometer reading imputation. 
Nonparametric and parametric statistical methods are 
utilized, with system and subsystem failure mode recurrence 
data, to measure reliability throughout the period of 
observation and amidst the installation of system modifying 
vehicle armor kits. Reliability metrics are quantified to 
capture the effects of usage and armoring, taking into 
account that the MTVR is a repairable system. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The United States Marine Corps’ involvement in 
Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) places increased demand on all 
types of ground equipment. Operations in Iraq have Marine 
Corps units widely dispersed in Al Anbar province, a battle 
space the size of Utah, creating the requirement for an 
extended logistics support structure. The backbone of this 
structure at the tactical level is the medium tactical 
wheeled vehicle, formally known as the Medium Tactical 
Vehicle Replacement (MTVR). The 874 cargo variant MTVRs in 
Iraq enable the distribution of materiel that supports 
combat operations, force protection measures, and daily life 
support requirements. These operating conditions demand more 
from the MTVR than a garrison environment does, thereby 
accelerating the vehicle’s aging process and modifying its 
nominal life cycle. 
The Marine Corps’ current need for reliability analysis 
and modeling stems from the duration of OIF and the costs of 
procuring and sustaining military ground equipment. These 
two factors impact how equipment is managed in support of 
operational plans and how funding is allocated for equipment 
life cycle requirements. The 34th Commandant of the Marine 
Corps addressed these factors in his 2006 Commandant’s 
Planning Guidance by identifying the requirement to “Develop 
better readiness and sustainment indicators based on 
predictive modeling, so that timely changes to strategies, 
plans, and programs can be implemented” (CMC, 2006, p. 10). 
This statement identifies a capability shortfall in the area  
 xviii
of equipment reliability modeling, and highlights that 
capability’s importance in strategic and operational level 
logistics. 
The degree to which OIF has accelerated vehicle age and 
impacted vehicle reliability is difficult to quantify. The 
existing Marine Corps maintenance and supply information 
systems do not directly answer these questions, nor do unit 
readiness reports or program level databases. Therefore, a 
detailed analysis is necessary to determine system 
performance in the area of reliability, and to create a 
predictive model of system and subsystem reliability based 
upon predominant operational factors. This information can 
be used to improve the planning, estimation, and decisions 
that are made for MTVR employment, sustainment, and 
disposal. 
Reliability is the probability that a system or 
component will perform its intended function under operating 
conditions, for a specified period of time (Meeker and 
Escobar, 1998, p. 2). As system reliability increases, the 
frequency of unscheduled maintenance decreases; conversely, 
as system reliability decreases, the frequency of 
unscheduled maintenance increases.  
The primary objectives of this thesis are to conduct a 
reliability analysis of the MTVR in OIF and to create a 
predictive model of MTVR system and subsystem reliability. A 
secondary objective is to provide a methodology for 
reliability analysis and modeling of Marine Corps ground 
equipment that can be referenced and utilized by maintenance 
managers, materiel managers, operations analysts, and 
program managers. 
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This thesis' analysis focuses on three areas to develop 
an understanding of the MTVR's reliability in OIF. These 
areas are operational use and performance, non-parametric 
statistical methods for reliability analysis and modeling, 
and parametric statistical methods for reliability analysis 
and modeling. 
Operational use and performance addresses the MTVR's 
utilization and performance at the tactical level. 
Utilization is identified by the system's usage rate, which 
is a factor of miles driven over operational time. Usage 
rate is a key element in reliability analysis and modeling 
because it provides a valid measure of the system operating 
age. Performance is measured by the amount and type of 
maintenance activity that the system requires, which is 
documented by failures at the subsystem level. The type and 
frequency of failures within variants, by unit, and by armor 
status provides an understanding of system and subsystem 
failure trends in the operating environment. 
A non-parametric statistical method for reliability 
analysis of repairable system recurrence data is based upon 
a cumulative plot of system or subsystem failure times. This 
method utilizes the Mean Cumulative Function (MCF) to 
visually represent average system or subsystem performance 
(Nathan and Trindade, 2006). The MCF is applied at the 
system and subsystem levels to identify trends and make 
comparisons between variants, units, and armor status. 
Recurrence data is also used in parametric statistical 
methods for reliability analysis and modeling. Failure event 
recurrence data are modeled as a Power Rule Non-Homogeneous 
Poisson Process. Recurrence data, that are found to match a 
 xx
homogeneous Poisson process model, are used to determine 
common reliability measures of effectiveness, including 
failure rate and Mean Time Between Failure (MTBF). Further 
modeling is conducted at the system level, using Poisson 
regression, to determine failure rate and MTBF based upon 






The United States Marine Corps’ involvement in 
Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) places increased demand on all 
types of ground equipment. Operations in Iraq have Marine 
Corps units widely dispersed in Al Anbar province, a battle 
space the size of Utah, creating the requirement for an 
extended logistics support structure. The backbone of this 
structure at the tactical level is the medium tactical 
wheeled vehicle, formally known as the Medium Tactical 
Vehicle Replacement (MTVR). The 874 cargo variant MTVRs in 
Iraq enable the distribution of materiel that support combat 
operations, force protection measures, and daily life 
support requirements. These operating conditions demand more 
from the MTVR than a garrison environment does, thereby 
accelerating the vehicle’s aging process and modifying its 
nominal life cycle. 
The Marine Corps' operating environment in Al Anbar 
province, Iraq's western region, consists of an arid climate 
amidst dispersed small urban areas and open desert. 
Temperatures range from 110 degrees Fahrenheit in the summer 
months to 37 degrees Fahrenheit in the winter months. 
Precipitation occurs during the winter months at an average 
of 1 inch per month, while the summer months receive no 
precipitation. The road network and conditions range from 
modern highways near Baghdad to unimproved roads in the 
Syrian Desert. Combat operations require the MTVR to use the 
existing road network, unimproved roads, and accessible 
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desert terrain. MTVR staging areas are predominantly 
uncovered sand lots, while maintenance areas are open-air 
covered hard-surface facilities. Desert sand and silt 
permeate all areas with the aid of desert winds and seasonal 
sand storms, which have the ability to reduce visibility to 
levels where vehicle movement is unsafe. Movement throughout 
the battle space is further complicated by the existence of 
insurgent forces. These forces leverage the vulnerable road 
network to their advantage by emplacing ambushes. These 
ambushes utilize small arms fire, Improvised Explosives 
Devices (IEDs), and mines to disrupt and destroy Marine 
forces. Convoy procedures incorporate measures to minimize 
the risk from these ambushes and the MTVR has received 
several armor upgrades to protect its crew, passengers, and 
cargo in case of attack.  
Reliability is commonly defined as the probability that 
a system or component will perform its intended function 
under operating conditions, for a specified period of time 
(Meeker and Escobar, 1998, p. 2). The Marine Corps’ current 
need for reliability analysis and modeling stems from the 
duration of OIF and the costs of procuring and sustaining 
military ground equipment. These two factors impact how 
equipment is managed in support of operational plans and how 
funding is allocated for equipment life cycle requirements. 
The 34th Commandant of the Marine Corps addressed these 
factors in his 2006 Commandant’s Planning Guidance by 
identifying the requirement to “Develop better readiness and 
sustainment indicators based on predictive modeling, so that 
timely changes to strategies, plans, and programs can be 
implemented” (CMC, 2006, p. 10). This statement identifies a 
capability shortfall in the area of equipment reliability 
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modeling, and highlights that capability’s importance in 
strategic and operational level logistics. 
The degree to which OIF has accelerated vehicle age and 
impacted vehicle reliability is difficult to quantify. The 
existing Marine Corps maintenance and supply information 
systems do not directly answer these questions, nor do unit 
readiness reports or program level databases. Therefore, a 
detailed analysis is necessary to determine system 
performance in the area of reliability, and to create a 
predictive model of system and subsystem reliability based 
upon predominant operational factors. This information can 
be used to improve the planning, estimation, and decisions 
that are made for MTVR employment, sustainment, and 
disposal. 
B. MEDIUM TACTICAL VEHICLE REPLACEMENT 
The MTVR is produced by Oshkosh Truck Corporation and 
has been in service in the Marine Corps since initial 
fielding between 2001 and 2003. This medium truck is the 
"workhorse" of the Marine Corps and fills the gap between 
the light vehicle fleet of High Mobility Multipurpose 
Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs) and the heavy vehicle fleet of 
Logistics Vehicle Systems (LVSs). While the MTVR family of 
vehicles includes dump and wrecker variants, the focus of 
this thesis is the cargo variant, which includes the 
standard bed and extended bed models shown in Table 1. The 
MTVR cargo variant is the primary vehicle that delivers 
supplies to forward-deployed units and that also reinforces 
the line-haul capability of the LVS. The capabilities of the  
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MTVR include towing weapon systems and transporting 
personnel, ammunition, break-bulk cargo, bulk liquids, cargo 
containers, and engineer equipment.  
 
ID Number Variant Description 
10629A  Standard Bed 
10629B  Standard Bed, with Winch 
10629C  Standard Bed, Armored 
10629D  Standard Bed, with Winch, Armored 
10631A  Extended Bed 
10631B  Extended Bed, with Winch 
10631D  Extended Bed, Armored 
10631E  Extended Bed, with Winch, Armored 
Table 1. MTVR Cargo Variants. 
 
The MTVR mission profile specifies 70 percent cross-
country use and 30 percent highway use, with a 7.1 ton and 
15 ton payload, respectively. The cargo variant 
specifications are in Appendix A and the baseline unarmored 
model, variant ID number 10629A, is shown in Figure 1. 




Figure 1. MTVR Cargo Variant, ID Number 10629A 
(GlobalSecurity.org, 2006). 
 
The Capability Development Document establishes 
reliability measures Of effectiveness (MOEs) to guide the 
development of a system that will meet operational mission 
performance standards. A comprehensive list of the MTVR's 
reliability MOEs is provided in Appendix A, with the 
applicable MOEs to this thesis shown below (USMC, 1997, p. 
10): 
• Mean Miles Between Operational Failures: 2000 
miles (minimum), 4000 miles (objective) 
• Probability of completing a 200 mile mission 
without a mission failure: 0.90 (minimum), 0.95 
(objective) 
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• Achieved availability: 0.89 (minimum), 0.90 
(objective) 
• Service Life: 0.70 probability of completing 77000 
miles (minimum) during its estimated 22 year 
service life without replacement of a major 
component, e.g., engine, transmission, drive 
train, cooling system, electrical system, etc. 
(objective). 
The MTVR is a repairable system that can be returned to 
operating status after a failure has occurred by replacing 
parts or adjusting settings. Repairable systems that fail 
have recurring maintenance and supply requirements that may 
change over time.  Mechanical systems often degrade and are 
not returned to as-new condition upon repair; consequently, 
times between repair events typically decrease in a 
degrading system. These failure and repair events occur 
within the MTVR's subsystems, which combine to provide the 
vehicle's capabilities and reliability. Examples of MTVR 
subsystems include the axle/suspension system (AXLE/SUSP), 
body (BODY), electrical system (ELEC), and engine (ENG). The 
complete MTVR subsystem list, with accompanying components, 
is provided in Appendix A.  
The focus of this thesis is to measure system and 
subsystem performance by analyzing unscheduled maintenance 
events at the subsystem level. Unscheduled maintenance 
events, generally referred to as a failure, are categorized 
as deadlining or non-deadlining according to the following 
criteria: 
• Deadlining failure: A failure that requires 
critical repairs and makes the system not mission 
capable. 
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• Non-deadlining failure: A failure that degrades 
system capabilities or requires non-critical 
maintenance. 
From the beginning of OIF in 2003, the Marine Corps has 
focused on providing armor protection for all of its motor 
transport equipment. The goal has been to provide the best 
protection possible to each of its vehicles in Iraq (Catto, 
2006, p. 7). To that end, the Marine Corps and Oshkosh Truck 
Corporation developed the MTVR Armor System (MAS), 
consisting of metal composite panel armor and Mil-A-46100 
high hard steel armor for the cab and troop carrier (Marine 
Corps Systems Command, 2007). The MAS, which was installed 
on all Iraq MTVRs between May 2005 and March 2006, is 
capable of withstanding small arms fire, IEDs, and mine 
blasts from up to 12 lbs of High Explosives. The armor 
solutions prior to the MAS were far less substantial, 
providing less protection to the crew, passengers, cargo, 
and vehicle. The two types of MAS armor outfit the vehicle 
undercarriage and cab, or the vehicle undercarriage, cab, 
and troop carrier. The significant aspects of the MAS, in 
relation to this thesis, are that it is a permanent 
modification to the MTVR that adds approximately 4000 lbs 
(cab armor kit) to 10,500 lbs (cab and troop carrier armor 
kits) to the vehicle's weight. The remaining MAS 
specifications are provided in Appendix A.  A photograph of 
an MTVR with the installed MAS (cab and troop carrier armor 




Figure 2. MTVR with MAS Cab and Troop Carrier Armor Kit 
(Defense Update, 2004). 
 
The MTVR cargo variant is selected as the equipment 
type for reliability analysis and modeling for the following 
reasons: 
• The MTVR is a reportable system in the Status of 
Resources and Training System (SORTS). SORTS 
reportable systems collectively provide a measure 
of a unit's overall equipment status or capability 
(MCBul 3000, 2007). 
• The MTVR is a comparatively new vehicle that has 
not undergone a rebuild program that could alter 
the system's reliability profile. 
• The MTVR vehicle fleet has not participated in a 
systematic rotation plan during OIF. The vehicles 
have been in Iraq since Marine Corps units re-
entered the country in February 2004, with the 
exception of vehicles that have replaced combat 
losses and vehicles distributed in support of the 
MAS armor installation process. This provides a 
continuous three-year period in which to observe 
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and collect system data with minimal changes in 
predominant operational and environmental factors. 
• Of the Marine Corps' ground equipment in Iraq, the 
MTVR provides a balance between the quantity 
available for sampling and the system cost. Among 
tracked and wheeled vehicles, the MTVR ranks 
second only to the HMMWV (COMUSMARCENT G4, 2007; 
United States Marine Corps, 2007). 
• MTVR usage data from recorded odometer readings 
are available from several sources. Because usage 
data are an important element in reliability 
analysis and modeling, this is a key consideration 
for selecting the MTVR for study. 
C. SYSTEM AVAILABILITY AND RELIABILITY THEORY 
System availability and readiness are synonymous terms 
that represent the degree, percentage, or probability that a 
system will be available when required for use. Reliability 
is an element of availability, along with maintainability 
and supportability. These performance measures are used 
during system design, development, and sustainment to 
optimize performance throughout a system’s life cycle 
(Blanchard, 2004, p. 72). 
For the Marine Corps, high levels of equipment 
availability are necessary for tactical operations to be 
efficient and effective. Tactical level planners and 
logisticians use historical trends in equipment availability 
to estimate the quantity that will be available for current 
and future operations. At the operational and strategic 
levels of war, forecasts of equipment availability project 
further into the future and have a broader impact. Forecasts 
at these levels impact equipment rotation policies, 
acquisition decisions, budget planning, secondary repairable 
inventory levels, and other resource requirements. 
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In reliability measurement, systems use “time” as an 
appropriately chosen metric to reflect usage: miles driven, 
hours of operation, etc. Statisticians and reliability 
engineers distinguish between “repairable” and “non-
repairable” systems when characterizing reliability.  As its 
name suggests, a repairable system is subject to repeated 
failure-repair cycles during its lifetime.  Reliability 
focuses on the times between failure events; or 
equivalently, on the number of failure events that occur 
during a given period of time. A typical pattern for a 
repairable system is an increasing rate of failures 
(decreasing time between failures) occurring as the system 
ages.  This is because repairs are not fully successful in 
restoring the system to “as-new” condition as stress and 
wear take their toll.   
Measures of reliability that are used with non-
repairable systems, such as the mean time to failure (MTTF) 
determined when the system is new, can give a misleading 
characterization of reliability for a repairable system.  
Measures appropriate for repairable systems include the Mean 
Cumulative Function (MCF) and the Rate Of Occurrence Of 
Failures (ROCOF) (NIST, 2003). The MCF is a function of 
time, denoted ( ) [ ( )],t E N tµ =  which gives the expected number of 
failures ( )N t  that occur up to time t.  The ROCOF also is a 
function of time, denoted ( ) ( )m t tµ′= , which is the first 
derivative of the MCF.  The ROCOF gives a measure of the 
instantaneous rate of failure at a particular time. 
A lifetime distribution model is represented by a 
probability density function ( )f t  that ranges from time 0t =  
to t = infinity. The cumulative distribution ( )F t  is the 
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probability that a system will fail by time t , which is 
obtained by integrating the density function: 
0
( ) ( ) ( )
t
F t P T t f u du= ≤ = ∫ , 
where T  is a random variable denoting lifetime.  Common 
lifetime distribution models, that can be used when the 
ROCOF is constant, include the exponential, Weibull, gamma, 
and lognormal distributions. 
D. INFORMATION SYSTEMS AND TOOLS 
The Marine Corps Integrated Maintenance Management 
System Automated Information System (MIMMS AIS) provides 
essential maintenance management information for logistics 
planning and decision making. MIMMS AIS data entry is 
performed by the mechanic or MIMMS clerk, in the unit 
maintenance shop or maintenance management office, as 
maintenance is conducted on equipment. Maintenance 
requirements are translated into supply requirements that 
are requisitioned through the Supported Activities Supply 
System (SASSY). These requisitions are tracked in SASSY and 
receive status updates until they are received by the 
requesting unit. Historical data generated by MIMMS AIS and 
SASSY are archived within the Marine Corps’ Master Data 
Repository (MDR). The MDR, managed by the Marine Corps 
Logistics Command (MARCORLOGCOM), is continuously updated 
and can be queried for data in support of logistics studies 
and analysis. 
The System Operational Effectiveness (SOE) tool, 
managed by the Capability Assessment Support Center (CASC), 
Marine Corps System Command (MARCORSYSCOM), is an automated 
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tool that enables logisticians, materiel managers, and 
program managers to monitor and improve system operational 
effectiveness throughout a system’s life cycle. Relying upon 
field maintenance and supply data in the MDR, the SOE tool 
utilizes algorithms to measure system performance in the 
areas of availability, maintainability, reliability, and 
supportability (CASC, 2006). This thesis builds upon the 
analysis capabilities within the SOE tool by conducting 
analysis at the unit, MTVR variant, and subsystem levels, 
and by incorporating system usage rates into failure mode 
analysis and modeling. 
The Total Life Cycle Management – Assessment Tool 
(TLCM-AT) is the Marine Corps’ first endeavor to use 
stochastic modeling and simulation analysis to achieve 
higher ground equipment readiness. The tool is currently 
under development by Clockwork Solutions and will be 
available in 2008 for the following systems: Amphibious 
Assault Vehicle (AAV), Light Armored Vehicle (LAV), Light 
Weight 155mm Howitzer, Logistics Vehicle System Replacement 
(LVSR), and Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement (MTVR). 
TLCM-AT is being designed to draw upon data within the MDR 
and SOE tool to perform Monte Carlo simulations of the life 
cycle behavior of aging systems in various operational 
environments. The tool utilizes a data model built upon the 
system's subsystem configuration, whereby subsystem failure 
times are independent and exponentially distributed. 
Operational and logistics considerations are incorporated in 
order to provide forecasts of operating and support costs, 
maintenance and supply performance, and system readiness 
(Clockwork Solutions, 2006). This thesis augments the TLCM-
AT MTVR model and output by conducting analysis at the unit, 
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MTVR variant, and subsystem levels, and by incorporating 
system usage rates into failure mode analysis and modeling. 
E. SCOPE OF THESIS 
The primary objectives of this thesis are to conduct a 
reliability analysis of the MTVR in OIF and to create a 
predictive model of MTVR system and subsystem reliability. A 
secondary objective is to provide a methodology for 
reliability analysis and modeling of Marine Corps ground 
equipment that can be referenced and utilized by maintenance 
managers, materiel managers, operations analysts, and 
program managers. The following questions are addressed to 
support these objectives: 
• What data are needed and where is it stored? 
• What is the quality of the data? 
• What measures must be taken to prepare the 
necessary data for reliability analysis and 
modeling? 
• What are the MTVR usage levels in OIF? 
• What is the OIF reliability performance of the 
MTVR and its subsystems? 
• What parametric and non-parametric statistical 
methods can be used for reliability analysis and 
modeling of the MTVR? What are the results of 
using these methods? 
The analysis presented in this thesis focuses on three 
areas to develop an understanding of the MTVR's reliability 
in OIF. These areas are operational use and performance, 
non-parametric statistical methods for reliability analysis 
and modeling, and parametric statistical methods for 
reliability analysis and modeling. 
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Operational use and performance addresses the MTVR's 
utilization and performance at the tactical level. 
Utilization is identified by the system's usage rate, which 
is the number of miles driven over vehicle operational time. 
Usage rate is a key element in reliability analysis and 
modeling because it provides a valid measure of the system 
operating age. Performance is measured by the amount and 
type of maintenance activity that the system requires, which 
is documented by failures at the subsystem level (axles and 
suspension, engine, electrical, etc.). Tracking the types 
and frequencies of failures within variants, before and 
after MAS armor installation, and by unit helps in 
developing an understanding of system and subsystem failure 
trends in the operating environment. 
A non-parametric statistical method for reliability 
analysis of repairable system recurrence data is based on 
the Mean Cumulative Function (MCF) (Meeker and Escobar, 
1998).  The MCF can be plotted against time to visually 
represent average system or subsystem performance (Nathan 
and Trindade, 2006). The MCF is applied at the system and 
subsystem levels to identify trends and to make comparisons 
between variants, by vehicle usage rate, by major unit, and 
before and after MAS armor installation. 
Recurrence data will also be analyzed using a 
parametric statistical method for reliability analysis and 
modeling. In this method, failure events will be modeled as 
a Poisson process with either a constant or nonconstant 
recurrence rate. Analysis at the system and subsystem levels  
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will enable Poisson process parameter estimation, confidence 
interval estimation, and checks for adequacy of the 
appropriate predictive model. 
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II. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
A. MTVR SAMPLE 
This thesis focuses on a sample of 456 cargo variant 
MTVRs taken from a population of 874 cargo variant MTVRs 
operating in OIF between March 1, 2004 and March 31, 2007. 
The selection of vehicles for the sample is constrained by 
the availability of armoring information from MARCORSYSCOM. 
Under this constraint, the goal is to create a sample of 
approximately 50 percent of the population, with equal 
representation of each cargo variant and major OIF unit. The 
final sample used for analysis consists of 398 vehicles 
taken from MARCORSYSCOM's MAS armor installation database, 
and the remaining 58 vehicles selected from the OIF 
population to achieve the equal representation of cargo 
variants and units. These units are the Marine Expeditionary 
Force (Forward) Headquarters Group (MHG), Marine Division 
(DIV), Marine Aircraft Wing (MAW), Marine Logistics Group 
(MLG), and Military Police (MP). Breakdowns of the sample by 
MTVR variant and unit are shown in Table 2 and Table 3, 
respectively. 
 
ID Number Variant Description Quantity
10629A(10629C)  Standard Bed (MAS) 306 
10629B(10629D)  Standard Bed with Winch (MAS) 67 
10631A(10631D)  Extended Bed (MAS) 56 
10631B(10631E)  Extended Bed with Winch (MAS) 27 











Table 3. Sample Composition by Unit. 
 
The nominal period of observation for MTVRs in the 
study is the 37-month period starting on March 1, 2004 and 
ending on March 31, 2007.  Although most vehicles were 
available for the entire 37-month period of observation, the 
periods of observation for some vehicles were shorter due to 
fielding after March 1, 2004, sourcing from OIF excess 
stocks during the period of observation, or combat loss. 
Table 4 shows the distribution of MTVR observation lengths, 
and Table 5 shows the vehicle age summary statistics at the 






0 – 5 1 
6 – 10 0 
11 - 15 4 
16 - 20 66 
21 - 25 3 
26 - 30 5 
31 - 36 15 
37 362 














Fielding 0 457 548 576 640 1333 
  
Miles 
Driven 10 107 2625 5367 7948 44131 





Fielding 107 442 572 569 704 990 
  
Miles 
Driven 14 112 1697 3776 4737 37738 
Table 5. Summary Statistics of Vehicle Age at the Start of 
the Period of Observation. 
 
MAS armor installation was completed during each 
vehicle's period of observation. Because the armoring of the 
MTVR fleet in OIF occurred over 11 months, the armoring date 
for each vehicle varies depending on when the vehicle was 
processed through the in-theater MAS installation 
facilities. The mean miles accumulated by the sample MTVRs 
upon receiving the MAS armor is 12,398 ± 1,011 (95 percent 
confidence interval). Additionally, Figure 3 provides a 
breakdown of the before MAS armor and after MAS armor 
installation time periods for the vehicles in the sample. A 
balance between these time periods is desired in order to 











































Figure 3. Summary of Vehicle MAS Armor Status Within the 
Period of Observation. 
 
B. DATA SETS AND RESOURCES 
The reliability analysis of the MTVR presented in this 
thesis would not have been possible without consolidating 
data from several sources. Each source either provided 
unique data or data that were used to reinforce or validate 
existing data. 
The primary source of maintenance and supply data is 
the MDR at MARCORLOGCOM. Data queries are submitted to the 
Studies and Analysis Department, MARCORLOGCOM, for deployed 
Marine Corps units during the period of observation. 
Maintenance data are extracted from the Equipment Repair 
Order (ERO) history file in the MDR. The ERO is the document 
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that captures maintenance actions and requirements as 
maintenance is performed on equipment. Appendix B presents 
an example of the MTVR ERO history data used in the thesis 
research. Maintenance actions that require repair parts rely 
on SASSY for repair part requisitioning and tracking. SASSY 
repair part requisitions, referenced by ERO numbers, are 
pulled from the repair parts history file in the MDR. 
Appendix C displays an example of the MTVR repair part 
history data extracted from SASSY. 
The data sets received from sources often contain more 
information than is needed to perform reliability analysis 
and modeling. Therefore, reducing the data sets to only the 
essential data elements is necessary. A summary of the 
essential data elements from the ERO history and Repair 
Parts history files is provided in Appendix D. 
Additional data are needed to obtain a comprehensive 
understanding of the events in a sample MTVR's lifecycle. 
They include manufacturing dates, fielding dates, MAS 
armoring information, and combat loss information. 
Manufacturing and fielding dates are obtained from Oshkosh 
Truck Corporation. The manufacturing date represents the 
date that a Marine Corps representative takes possession of 
a newly manufactured vehicle. The Required Delivery Date is 
the fielding date for a vehicle to its respective Marine 
Corps unit. The next key event in the life of a fielded MTVR 
is the MAS armoring process, for which information is 
provided by the Program Manager Motor Transportation, 
MARCORSYSCOM. This information contains the date that a 
vehicle completes the MAS armoring process, along with the 
type of MAS armor installed. Lastly, if a vehicle is 
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destroyed during combat operations, the vehicle is 
considered a combat loss and its period of observation ends. 
Documentation of MTVR combat loss dates is obtained from the 
Recoverable Items Report (WIR) Online Process Handler 
(WOLPH) database at MARCORLOGCOM. 
To facilitate analysis, other information is derived 
from the data received from the aforementioned resources. 
The five major units, which encompass all Marine Corps 
operating forces in OIF, are identified by the Unit 
Identification Code (UIC) in MIMMS. The type of maintenance 
conducted on a vehicle is categorized as scheduled or 
unscheduled. These maintenance categories are recognized by 
using the Defect Code in MIMMS.  A list of Defect Codes 
produced by the sample MTVRs during the period of 
observation is provided in Appendix E.  For the purpose of 
analysis, vehicle failures in the field are assumed to be 
represented as unscheduled maintenance events. Unscheduled 
maintenance beyond a unit's local (organic) capability is 
handled by a higher level of maintenance capability. This 
situation must be identified to accurately represent the 
time a vehicle is in the maintenance process. A maintenance 
event is categorized by the subsystem for which maintenance 
action is required. Subsystem groups generated from Defect 
Codes are identified in Appendix E, while subsystem groups 
generated from repair part requisitions are identified using 
the subsystem configuration and parts list in the MTVR 





C. DATA QUALITY 
The quality of data used in reliability analysis and 
modeling directly affects the accuracy of the results. With 
this in mind, a specific effort is made to review and 
improve the quality of the data. 
The ERO history data requires considerable review and 
improvement before use. The elements of the ERO history data 
that require improvement are the ID Number, Table of 
Authorized Materiel Control Number (TAMCN), Defect Code, and 
odometer reading. Following the review and correction of ID 
Numbers and TAMCNs, a comparison is made with the original 
data. The results of the comparison are in Table 6. 
 
 Correct ID Number Correct TAMCN 
No MAS 86.42% 95.57% 
MAS 71.21% 72.73% 
Overall 78.04% 82.98% 
Table 6. Accuracy of Vehicle Information in ERO History 
Data. 
 
The TAMCN has a higher accuracy because it is a broader 
designation than the ID Number. MTVRs with MAS have the 
lowest accuracy even though MAS installation is a permanent 
modification to the MTVR, changing the ID Number and TAMCN. 
These designation changes are a reason for the low accuracy. 
Defect Code accuracy is also measured through a 
comparison with repair part requisitions, of which 53.5 
percent of EROs have. Of the EROs with repair part 
requisitions, only 23.5 percent have a Defect Code subsystem 
failure mode that matches the subsystem failure mode 
generated from repair part requisitions. Failure 
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identification of a specific subsystem through repair part 
requisitions is considered reliable because it is generated 
from SASSY data, based upon the highest requisition priority 
and largest subsystem cost within the ERO. Defect Code 
accuracy is based upon the proficiency and attention to 
detail of the mechanic who is creating the ERO, and 
therefore is less objective and more subjective. 
The usage age of a vehicle is represented by the number 
of miles it has accumulated. Marine Corps equipment has 
mileage documented each time an ERO is created. 
Unfortunately, the mileage records are not accurate enough 
to use without detailed review and refinement. Within the 
period of observation, and with the use of odometer readings 
from two other sources, 45.3 percent of MTVR ERO history 
odometer readings are determined to be useful for analysis. 
The low percentage of usable odometer readings is a result 
of human and system factors, including: 
• Errors in the manual transfer of the odometer 
reading from the vehicle, to the ERO, and into 
MIMMS AIS. 
• Entries that are not odometer readings, i.e., 
12345, 343434, or 9999. 
• The incorrect recording of the hour-meter on the 
tachometer dial as the odometer reading. 
• The side by side placement in the instrument panel 
of the tachometer dial, containing the hour-meter, 
and the speedometer dial, containing the odometer. 
This placement is shown in Figure 4. 
• The odometer is digital while the hour-meter is 
analog. The hour-meter reading is always visible 
while the odometer reading is only visible when 
vehicle electrical power is on. This factor is 








Figure 5. MTVR Hour Meter and Odometer (Oshkosh Truck 
Corporation, 2004). 
 
The quality of the repair part requisition data is 
degraded only by occasional requisitions for items that are 
not MTVR repair parts. These items include repair parts for 
small arms, maintenance shop supplies, office supplies, and 
uniform items. Each of these items is categorized to not 
affect reliability analysis and modeling. The manufacturing 
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dates, fielding dates, MAS armoring information, and combat 
loss information have no noticeable data quality issues. 
D. DATA REFINEMENT 
Refinement of the MTVR sample data is necessary in 
order to recover as much information as possible from 
odometer readings, to manage data censoring and truncation, 
and to recognize repeat sequential failures due to poor 
maintenance or poor maintenance quality control. Data 
refinement significantly improves the quality and quantity 
of useful data in the sample. 
Odometer readings obtained from a vehicle's maintenance 
history are regarded as valid through the use of the 
following rules: 
• Odometer readings are non-decreasing over time; 
• Upon identification of a legitimate odometer 
reading, if the subsequent readings beyond the 
next ERO are the same as the legitimate odometer 
reading, they are not legitimate; 
• Patterns such as  9999, 232323, 12345, and 9876 
are not legitimate; 
• Increases greater than 2000 miles per month are 
not legitimate; 
• An odometer reading that closely matches an 
odometer reading taken from another source is 
legitimate. 
Where possible, odometer readings that are not usable are 
approximated by imputation using valid odometer readings. 
Imputation occurs through interpolation between two usable 
odometer readings and their respective dates, providing a 
usable odometer reading history for each vehicle with at 
least two originally usable odometer readings. Additionally, 
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extrapolation with the unit daily mean usage rate is used to 
estimate odometer readings at the beginning and end of a 
vehicle's maintenance history, and for vehicles with only 
one usable odometer reading. The odometer reading imputation 



















Start Obs. 3/1/2004   15   191 34447 
Failure 9/8/2004   15   493 37384 
Sched. Maint. 1/14/2006 44964 36 53 66   
Sched. Maint. 5/13/2006   36   10 47310 
Failure 5/23/2006 47665 17 1 7   
Sched. Maint. 5/31/2006   17   19 47784 
Sched. Maint. 6/19/2006 48107 51 8 111   
Failure 10/16/2006 53723 15 24 142   
End Obs. 3/31/2007         55906 
Table 7. Example of Odometer Reading Imputation. 
 
As is typical of reliability studies, some failure 
times are right censored at the end of the observation 
period for each vehicle.  Similarly, failure events that 
occur before the beginning of the observation period are not 
observed, and are formally regarded as truncated (Meeker and 
Escobar, 1998, p. 41). Censoring and truncation must be 
recognized in reliability analysis and modeling, and are 
managed through data formatting and the statistical software 
used. 
Repeat sequential failures of the same subsystem are 
found periodically in the ERO history data. When the same 
subsystem fails within a short period of time, it can be a 
result of poor maintenance quality. Post maintenance quality 
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control checks exist to detect inadequate maintenance, but 
these checks do not completely eliminate the need to repeat 
maintenance actions on the same problem. Because repeat 
sequential failures of this nature will distort analyses and 
modeling, they are removed from the data. Specifically, a 
repeat sequential failure is removed from the data if it 
occurs within seven days of the previous failure within the 
same subsystem, and if there are no intervening failures 
from different subsystems. 
E. DATA FORMATTING FOR ANALYSIS AND MODELING 
The final step before conducting analysis and 
statistical modeling is to format the data in accordance 
with the statistical software used. The software used in 
this thesis is S-PLUS® version 7.0.6 (Insightful Corp., 
2005) and S-PLUS Life Data Analysis (SPLIDA) version 6.8.1 
(Meeker, 2006). SPLIDA is a collection of S-PLUS extensions 
for conducting analysis of reliability data. It is capable 
of analyzing censored life data, recurrence data, and the 
MCF (Meeker and Escobar, 2004, p. 7). 
The refined ERO history data, represented in Appendix 
B, are formatted as a data object which contains vehicle 
failure times and failure origin within the observation 
start and end dates. The data object is created using the 
ERO history data, critical MTVR life dates, major unit MTVR  
usage rates, and an odometer reading imputation function, to 






This chapter presents both parametric and nonparametric 
statistical analyses of the MTVR data described in 
Chapter II.  Before presenting these analyses, the usage 
profiles of MTVRs fielded in OIF are described, which 
provides useful insights to the analyses that follow. 
A. OPERATIONAL USE AND PERFORMANCE 
Starting with a sample of 456 MTVRs fielded in OIF 
during the timeframe of the thesis research, data review and 
refinement resulted in usable odometer readings for 378 of 
these vehicles. Analyzing these 378 MTVRs by variant and 
unit suggests different operational attributes that may 
affect the performance of MTVRs in the field. 
For the reduced sample of 378 MTVRs the mean usage is 
336 miles per month. A detailed breakdown of monthly usage, 
by variant and unit, is shown in Figure 6, Figure 7, and 
Table 8. The two basic cargo variant models, the Standard 
Bed and the Extended Bed, have similar profiles although 
there is greater sample variability among the Standard Bed 
vehicles.  The Extended Bed, which is used in logistics 
organizations, is tasked to carry more cargo than the 
Standard Bed, and its median usage is about 100 miles per 
month greater than the Standard Bed. Regarding unit usage, 
the logistics unit (MLG) is highest, which is not surprising 
given that this unit’s mission is to provide logistics 
support throughout Al Anbar province.  The headquarters unit 
(MHG) has the lowest monthly usage. The coefficient of 
variation for unit mean monthly vehicle usage, determined by 
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dividing the standard deviation by the mean, indicates how 
evenly an organization is using their MTVRs. A lower value 
for the infantry division unit (DIV) and aircraft wing unit 
(MAW) indicates even usage, whereas a higher value exhibited 



















Figure 6. Boxplot of Monthly MTVR Usage by Variant. Center 























Figure 7. Boxplot of Monthly MTVR Usage by Unit. Center 
Lines in Boxes Represent Medians. Boxes Range from Lower to 
Upper Quartiles. 
 
  Sample DIV MAW MHG MLG MP 
Mean 357 377 276 195 469 351 
Median 269 293 233 147 353 284 
Standard 
Deviation 302 243 186 155 408 248 
Coefficient Of 
Variation 0.84 0.64 0.67 0.80 0.87 0.71 
Table 8. Vehicle Monthly Usage Summary. 
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The frequency of system level failures in the two basic 
cargo variant models corresponds with their mean monthly 
usage. The Extended Bed produces 6.8 failures per vehicle 
with a mean monthly usage of 344 miles, while the Standard 
Bed produces 5.4 failures per vehicle with a mean monthly 
usage of 332 miles. For units, Figure 8 shows that the 
headquarters unit (MHG) and aircraft wing unit (MAW) have 
the highest failures per vehicle even though their unit 
usage is the lowest of the five units. The infantry division 
unit (DIV) has the second lowest failures per vehicle while 
having the second highest unit usage. These comparisons 
indicate a relationship between vehicle failures, usage 


























Figure 8. Failures Per Vehicle by Unit. 
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Reliability of the MTVR is determined from the 
reliability of each of its subsystems. While these 
subsystems vary in size, design, and purpose, each is 
affected by operational use and environmental factors. A 
Pareto chart of subsystem failures and deadlining failures 
is shown in Figure 9 and Figure 10, respectively. While the 
BODY subsystem contains the most failures, this subsystem is 
affected by numerous interim armor applications prior to the 
MAS, which inflate the BODY subsystem number of failures. 
This inflation is caused by interim armor applications being 
treated as unscheduled maintenance, when they should be 
treated as scheduled maintenance. The AXLE/SUSP subsystem 
comprises 22 percent of the system's failures and 23 percent 
of the system's deadlining failures. Moderate deadlining 
failure activity is shown in the ELEC subsystem (13 percent) 
and ENG subsystem (13 percent), and the remaining subsystems 
comprise less than 11 percent of the system's deadlining 
failures. While these charts provide an understanding of 
which subsystems are demanding the most maintenance and 
supply attention, individual subsystem performance 
determination should occur within the context of the total 
number of repair parts in each subsystem. As shown in Table 
9, the FUEL, AXLE/SUSP, and ENG subsystems demand the most 
failure attention per subsystem part count, while the FUEL, 
COOL, and AXLE/SUSP subsystems demand the most deadlining 























































































































































FUEL 105 28 23 0.267 0.219 
AXLE/SUSP 2848 558 296 0.196 0.104 
ENG 1779 218 169 0.123 0.095 
TRAN 1353 145 37 0.107 0.027 
COOL 512 53 94 0.104 0.184 
BODY 9100 739 170 0.081 0.019 
ELEC 5769 312 263 0.054 0.046 
OTHER 6301 315 76 0.050 0.012 
AIR 3031 132 129 0.044 0.043 
HYDR 3304 16 6 0.005 0.002 
Table 9. Subsystem Part and Failure Comparison. 
 
The AXLE/SUSP subsystem is further analyzed due to its 
high failure and deadlining failure activity. The Repair 
Part history data and MTVR IETM subsystem configuration and 
parts list enable a review of deadlining failures at the 
AXLE/SUSP subsystem's component level. Table 10 shows the 
results of this review. The Front Axle/Suspension and Rear 
Axle/Suspension components demand significant attention by 
producing high parts ordered per number of component parts. 
The Wheel and Tire Group, though, has the highest number of 
parts ordered per number of component parts. This is due to 
a large demand for the following repair parts: Pneumatic 
Tire (NSN 2610-01-334-2694), Plain Hexagon Nut (NSN 5310-01-
492-5571), Wheel and Tire Assembly (NSN 2530-01-497-0440), 























Axle/Suspension 1387 49 2343 53 
Rear 
Axle/Suspension 757 27 1141 26 
Automatic Breaking 
System 261 9 309 7 
Steering System 229 8 151 3 
Central Tire 
Inflation System 135 5 139 3 
Wheel and Tire 
Group 79 3 373 8 
Table 10. Summary of AXLE/SUSP Subsystem Component 
Performance for Deadlining Failures. 
 
B. NONPARAMETRIC STATISTICAL METHODS 
A cumulative plot of the number of failures versus the 
age of a system is the simplest reliability graph for a 
repairable system. The plot can be modified easily to match 
the given data or desired analysis. Failures can represent 
degrees of failure, subsystem failures, or carry a weight 
such as days deadlined or repair cost, and age can be 
replaced with chronological time, vehicle operational time 
(i.e., not deadlined), or miles driven. The plotted line 
represents the system performance over time, and categorizes 
the system performance as stable (constant slope), improving 
(decreasing slope), or worsening (increasing slope). 
A determination of the average behavior of numerous 
systems is achieved by using the Mean Cumulative Function 
(MCF). The MCF is calculated as failure events occur for 
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systems at a point in time, and manages truncation and 
censoring by focusing only on the observed systems. The MCF 
is defined as 
0( ) 0MCF t =  
1





w tMCF t MCF t
N t−
= +  
where 0 1 1, ,..., ,k kt t t t−  represent increasing times of failure 
events from start time 0t  (MTVR fielding) to the thk  failure 
event, ( )kw t  is the weight associated with the failure event, 
and ( )kN t  is the number of MTVRs being observed at time kt  
(Glosup, Heavlin, and Trindade, 2007). Unit weights ( ) 1kw t =  
are the most commonly used, so that ( )MCF t  estimates the 
mean number of failures experienced by a unit up to time t . 
If costs (severity) of failures are measured then these can 
be used as weights, and ( )MCF t  estimates the mean cost of 
failures up to time t . Table 11 illustrates the MCF 
















1/15/2007 3 1/3 1/3 
1/30/2007 3 1/3 2/3 
2/10/2007 3 1/3 1 
2/15/2007 2 1/2 3/2 
2/28/2007 2 1/2 2 
3/5/2007 1 1/1 3 
3/10/2007 1 1/1 4 
Table 11. Example of MCF Calculation. 
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The MCF is a nonparametric estimator of the population 
mean cumulative number of arrivals (or mean cumulative cost, 
depending on the weights used) for a typical unit.  It does 
not assume any pre-specified functional form.  Large-sample 
confidence intervals for the population MCF can be derived 
using well-known formulas.  A detailed description of the 
statistical properties of the MCF and its underlying 
assumptions is given in Meeker and Escobar (1998). 
MCF plots obtained with SPLIDA enable reliability 
analysis at the system, subsystem, variant, unit, and MAS 
armor status levels. The time factor in MCF plots can be 
based upon chronological time (Days), operational time (Net 
Days), miles driven (Miles), or net miles driven (Net 
Miles). While like time factors, such as Days and Net Days, 
produce similar plots, there is a difference between plots 
based upon time and miles driven.  This difference is 
illustrated in Figure 11 and Figure 12. The MCF plot with 
Net Days has an increasing slope, indicating worsening 
performance as the systems age, while the MCF plot with Net 
Miles has a constant slope, indicating stable performance. 
Because age of a mechanical system usually is best 
expressed in terms of usage, and because usage does not 
increase at times when a vehicle is deadlined, MCF plots are 
based on Net Miles in the remainder of the thesis. This 
determination is supported by strong coefficients of 
correlation between unit Net Miles and unit failures (0.90), 
and unit Net Miles and unit deadlining failures (0.87). The 
Days, Net Days, and Miles time factors do not have a strong 
coefficient of correlation in both failure categories like 
Net Miles does. 
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Figure 11. MTVR System MCF with 95 Percent Confidence 
Interval. Time is Measured in Net Days. 
























Figure 12. MTVR System MCF with 95 Percent Confidence 
Interval. Time is Measured in Net Miles. 
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Failure and deadlining failure MCF plots are produced 
for each unit in Figure 13 and Figure 14. The MCF plot of 
failures is noticeably different than the MCF plot of  
deadlining failures. Regarding MTVR failures, the MCF value 
for the headquarters unit (MHG) is the highest at any given 
time, while the logistics unit (MLG) maintains lower MCF 
values throughout. Table 12 shows unit failure MCF values at 
10,000 and 20,000 Net Miles, along with the unit's mean 
monthly usage. When unit mean monthly usage is compared to 
the corresponding MTVR failure MCF value at 10,000 and 
20,000 Net Miles, the resulting coefficients of correlation 
are -0.97. This analysis shows that there is a strong 
inverse relationship between unit usage and MTVR failure MCF 
values. A potential cause of this relationship is that units 
with lower usage rates have more opportunity to address 
failure events as they arise, causing more unscheduled 
maintenance events.  Alternatively, units with high usage 
may defer or combine the handling of failures, causing less 
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MHG 195 8.3 14.6 
DIV 377 4.5 10.0 
MAW 276 5.5 11.2 
MLG 469 3.0 7.0 
MP 351 5.2 9.3 
Table 12. Comparison of Unit Usage and MTVR Failures MCF 
Values. 
 
The noteworthy similarity between Figure 13 and Figure 
14 is the logistics unit (MLG) MCF plot. Both depict the 
logistics unit (MLG) with the lowest MCF values per Net 
Miles, even though that unit has the highest mean usage. The 
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infantry division unit (DIV) deadlining failure MCF plot 
shows the highest values beyond 20,000 Net Miles, with a 
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Figure 14. MTVR Deadlining Failures MCF Plot by Unit. 
 
The Standard Bed and Extended Bed MTVR variants produce 
similar MCF values up to 30,000 Net Miles, as shown in 
Figure 15 and Figure 16. After this point, MCF values for 
the variants begin to diverge, with the Extended Bed MTVR 
produces the lowest failure and deadlining failure MCF 
values beyond 30,000 Net Miles. The Standard Bed with MAS 
Cab produces the highest deadlining failure MCF values 
beyond 30,000 Net Miles, with a slight increasing slope MCF 
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Figure 16. MTVR Deadlining Failures MCF Plot by Variant. 
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A comparison of MTVR deadlining failures before and 
after MAS armor installation demonstrates how the MTVR 
manages the additional weight of the MAS armor. A plot of 
the MCF values before MAS armor installation minus the MCF 
values after the MAS armor installation will provide this 
comparison.  Figure 17 shows this comparison for each 
variant. If there is no change in MCF performance before and 
after MAS armor installation, the plotted line will follow 
the "0" value horizontal axis. Yet the comparative plots for 
the Standard Bed with MAS Cab and the Standard Bed with MAS 
Cab and Troop Carrier each show a negative slope line, 
identifying higher MCF values after MAS armor installation 
than before MAS armor installation. The variant that shows 
the greatest difference from before to after MAS armor 













Figure 17. Difference in MCF for Deadlining Failures Before 
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The results of the MCF comparison of before and after 
MAS armor installation are further substantiated through the 
use of the sign test (Conover, 1999, p. 157). Assuming 
, ,~ ( , )B i B i BN Poisson τ λ  and , ,~ ( , )A i A i AN Poisson τ λ , where ,B iN  is the 
number of failures before MAS armor installation for vehicle 
i , ,A iN  is the number of failures after MAS installation for 
vehicle i , ,B iτ  is the observed time before MAS installation 
for vehicle i , ,A iτ  is the observed time after MAS 
installation for vehicle i , Bλ  is the failure rate before 
MAS installation, and Aλ  is the failure rate after MAS 
installation,  
, , ,/B i B i B iNλ τ
∧ =  
, , ,/A i A i A iNλ τ
∧ =  
and 
, ,A i B iiD λ λ
∧ ∧= −  
Letting ( 0)iP D p> = , a Sign Test (Conover, 1999) is conducted 
using the test statistic #{ 0}iS D= > where 
0
1
:        ( .5)
:       ( .5)
H Failure rate does not increase with MAS p
H Failure rate does increase with MAS p
≤
>  
The sample size is #{ 0}in D= ≠ .  Table 13 shows the results 





( 0)ip P D= >  
for Failures
 




Standard Bed w/ 
MAS Cab 0.85 0.73 
Standard Bed w/ 
MAS Cab & TC 0.75 0.65 
Extended Bed w/ 
MAS Cab 0.68 0.57 
Table 13. Sign Test Results for Failures and Deadlining 
Failures by Variant. 
 
The AXLE/SUSP subsystem is further analyzed using MCF 
plots due to its high failure and deadlining failure 
activity. While an MCF plot of subsystem failures produces 
similar results for each variant, as shown in Figure 18, the 
MCF comparison of before MAS armor installation and after 
MAS armor installation clearly shows the different 
performance of the subsystem in each variant. Figure 19 
shows that a higher MCF trend exists after MAS armor 
installation than before MAS armor installation for the 
Standard Bed with the MAS Cab armor kit. Deadlining failure 
MCF values in Figure 20 provide a slightly different result. 
The Standard Bed with MAS Cab and Troop Carrier shows 
worsening performance after 30,000 Net Miles, while the 
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Figure 19. Difference in AXLE/SUSP Subsystem MCF for 
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Figure 20. AXLE/SUSP Subsystem Deadlining Failures MCF Plot 
by Variant. 
 
The MCF can be modified to incorporate a measure of 
weight, associated with the failure event, by using the 
failure event's number of days deadlined. The number of days 
deadlined for a failure event is affected by maintenance and 
supply activity. Assigning days deadlined to ( )kw t  in the MCF 
calculation will produce the cumulative lack of availability 
during the period of observation. This technique is applied 
at the system and AXLE/SUSP subsystem levels for each 
variant, with the results shown in Figure 21 and Figure 22. 
The weighted MCF plot in Figure 21 shows that the Standard 
Bed and Extended Bed variants diverge after approximately 
30,000 Net Miles. Figure 22 also shows this divergence, but 











0 10000 20000 30000 40000 50000 60000





































0 10000 20000 30000 40000 50000





























Figure 22. AXLE/SUSP Subsystem Deadlined Days Weighted MCF 
Plot by Variant. 
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C. PARAMETRIC STATISTICAL METHODS 
The Poisson process is a common parametric model used 
for analyzing recurrence data.  To use this model with 
recurrence data, the following conditions must be met: 
• The number of failures at time 0t =  is zero, or 
(0) 0N = . 
• The number of recurrences in disjoint time 
intervals are independent, referred to as having 
independent increments. 
• The recurrence rate ( )tυ  is positive and 
( , ) [ ( , )] ( )
b
a
a b E N a b u duµ υ= = < ∞∫ , when 0 a b≤ < < ∞ . 
A nonhomogeneous Poisson process (NHPP) model is used when a 
nonconstant recurrence rate exists. When used in relation to 
the power-model recurrence rate, 
1
( ; , ) tt
ββυ β η η η
−⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ , 0β > , 0η > . 
Using the power-model recurrence rate, the mean cumulative 
number of recurrences over (0, ]t  is ( ; , ) tt
β
µ β η η
⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ . In 
instances when 1β = , a constant recurrence rate, the model 
becomes a homogeneous Poisson process (HPP) model (Meeker 
and Escobar, 1998, p. 406). 
A Power Rule NHPP Maximum Likelihood Estimate (MLE) is 
calculated from non-parametric MCF plots using SPLIDA.  The 
results of these calculations, for deadlining failures at 
the system level in the periods before MAS armor 
installation and after MAS armor installation, are shown in 
Table 14 and Table 15. Because β=1 is achieved, or closely 
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achieved, in both Table 14 and Table 15 within the 95% 
confidence interval, the deadlining failure recurrence rate 
is modeled as a HPP. 
 








MAS Cab η 6436 1568 3362 9510 
  β 1.03 0.15 0.73 1.33 
Standard Bed, 
MAS Cab & TC η 5819 1282 3306 8333 
  β 1.01 0.14 0.74 1.28 
Extended Bed, 
MAS Cab η 5027 2192 732 9322 
  β 0.84 0.19 0.46 1.21 
Table 14. Power Rule NHPP MLE by Variant for Deadlining 
Failures Before MAS Armor Installation. 
 








MAS Cab η 2850 776 1329 4371 
  β 1.10 0.12 0.87 1.33 
Standard Bed, 
MAS Cab & TC η 3931 1003 1966 5896 
  β 1.11 0.13 0.85 1.36 
Extended Bed, 
MAS Cab η 3539 2363 -1093 8171 
  β 1.00 0.28 0.46 1.54 
Table 15. Power Rule NHPP MLE by Variant for Deadlining 
Failures After MAS Armor Installation. 
 
The HPP model enables the use of a Poisson process with a 
constant recurrence rate. Furthermore, the HPP is a renewal 
process with inter-recurrence times that follow an 
exponential distribution (Meeker and Escobar, 1998, p. 408). 
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These characteristics enable the calculation of failure rate 
(λ ) and Mean Time Between Failure (MTBF), where 
• Failure rate (λ ): The total number of failures 
within an item population, divided by the total 
time expended by that population, during a 
particular measurement interval under stated 
conditions (CNO, 2003, p. 57). 
• Mean Time Between Failure (MTBF): For a particular 
interval, the total functional life of a 
population of an item divided by the total number 
of failures within the population (CNO, 2003, p. 
62). 
                     1MTBF λ=  
The η  and β  values in Table 14 and Table 15 are 
applied to determine the MTBF at a specified time, through 
11 expt
t tMTBF P G
β β
η β η η
⎡ ⎤ ⎧ ⎫⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎪ ⎪= Γ + >⎢ ⎥ ⎨ ⎬⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎢ ⎥ ⎪ ⎪⎣ ⎦ ⎩ ⎭
 
where t  is the time factor (Net Miles), Γ is the Gamma 
function, and G  is a random variable having a standard 
gamma distribution with shape parameter 1/ β . This 
relationship is derived in Appendix G. Figure 23 shows a 
modified MTBF plot, for Mean Miles Between Deadlining 
Failure, for the period after MAS armor installation. The 
Extended Bed with MAS Cab armor shows better MTBF 
performance, potentially because of its mission and assigned 
units.  These units are primarily the MAW and MLG, with 
missions that utilize hard surface roads over greater 
distances. When compared to the Mean Miles Between 
Operational Failure reliability MOE, represented by 
horizontal black dashed lines, each variant is below the  
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4,000 mile objective.  Additionally, the Standard Bed with 
MAS Cab armor approaches and surpasses the 2,000 mile 













Figure 23. Mean Miles Between Deadlining Failure by Variant, 
as Usage Varies, After MAS Armor Installation. 
 
Estimates of failure rate and MTBF are also determined 
for specific time intervals using the assumptions of the 
HPP. While the time interval can be delimited by a specified 
date or miles driven, this analysis uses the period before 
MAS armor installation and the period after MAS armor 
installation to estimate failure rate and MTBF over Net 
Miles driven. Table 16 shows an increase in each variant's 
λ , from the before to after MAS armor installation periods, 
by 162 percent, 76 percent, and 82 percent, respectively. 



































before to after MAS armor installation periods. It is noted 
that the Standard Bed with MAS Cab armor vehicles go from 
the best performance before the MAS armor installation, to 
the worst performance after MAS armor installation. The Mean 
Miles Between Operational Failure reliability MOE, 
represented by horizontal black dashed lines, is again 
compared to each variant's performance.  While all variants 
are above the 4,000 mile objective in the period before MAS 
armor installation, each variant is below that MOE after MAS 
armor installation. The Standard Bed with MAS Cab armor is 
the variant closest to the 2,000 mile minimum.  
 
λ (Deadlining Failures Per 10,000 Net 
Miles)
Before MAS Install After MAS Install
Standard Bed, 
MAS Cab 1.52 4.00
Standard Bed, 
MAS Cab & TC 1.81 3.19
Extended Bed, 
MAS Cab 1.64 2.99  
Table 16. Deadline Failure Rates by Variant for the Before 




















Figure 24. Mean Miles Between Deadlining Failure by Variant 
for the Before and After MAS Armor Installation Periods. 
 
The HPP characteristics of the failure event recurrence 
data are further analyzed with a generalized linear model 
(GLM). A GLM allows for the incorporation of non-normal 
response variable distributions that are members of the 
exponential family (Montgomery, Peck, and Vining, 2001, p. 
443). This relates to the MTVR failure event recurrence data 
following the HPP model. Poisson regression is used to model 
the relationship between failure events and the predominant 
predictor variables in this study, which are the MTVR time 
factor, variant, unit, and armor status.  For the purpose of 
this analysis, another predictor variable used is the 
vehicle serial number, which is a blocking factor in the 
sense that two measurements are obtained for each vehicle in 










































A fitted Poisson regression model for determining 
deadline failure rate and the mean time between deadlining 
failure, for the time periods before and after MAS armor 
installation, is presented below. The time factor used is 
Net Miles, and the vehicle sample used to generate this 
fitted model consists of the 378 MTVRs with useable odometer 
readings. The model takes the following form: 
0 2 2 5 5 2 2 5 5
2
log( ) ( ... ) ( ... )
              log(  )k j jj
u u v a u v u v
s Net Miles
λ β δ δ γ σ ω ω
τ=
= + + + + + + + +
+ +∑  
where λ  is the deadline failure rate, 0β  is the intercept, 
iδ  is the coefficient for unit iu , γ  is the coefficient for 
variant v (either Standard Bed or Extended Bed), σ  is the 
coefficient for armored ( 0  no MAS, 1  MAS)a a= ⇒ = ⇒  , iω  is the 
coefficient for unit iu  of variant v, jτ  is the coefficient 
for vehicle serial number s , and  Net Miles  is the number of 
Net Miles during the respective vehicle's time period. This 
model is the result of first fitting a full set of 
interactions involving unit, variant, and armoring and then 
using backward elimination to remove insignificant 
predictors. The fitted model's coefficient values are shown 








Coefficient Variable Value 
0β  Intercept -27.023 
2δ  MAW, Standard Bed 18.542 
3δ  MHG, Standard Bed 19.511 
4δ  MLG, Standard Bed 18.757 
5δ  MP, Standard Bed 18.451 
γ  Variant 18.691 
σ  Armored 0.922 
2ω  MAW, Extended Bed -18.976 
3ω  MHG, Extended Bed N/A 
4ω  MLG, Extended Bed -19.875 
5ω  MP, Extended Bed N/A 
Table 17. Poisson Regression Fitted Model Coefficient 
Values. N/A implies that the interaction is not estimable. 
 
Because the Armored variable does not interact with any 
other variable, it is possible to identify a single, concise 
measure of the deadline failure rate difference in the 
periods before and after MAS armor installation. The Armored 
variable coefficient (σ ) has an estimated value of 0.922 
(0.104 standard error), with a 95 percent confidence 
interval of [0.835, 1.01]. For a given vehicle, the ratio of 
expected deadlining failures per 10,000 miles after MAS 
armor installation to the expected value before MAS armor 








⎛ ⎞ = = =⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
, 
with a 95 percent confidence interval of [2.30, 2.74]. The 
reciprocal of this ratio relates to MTBF, and is .398 with a 
95 percent confidence interval of [.365, .434]. This ratio 
represents the percent reduction in MTBF from the period 
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before MAS armor installation to the period after MAS armor 
installation. Deadlining failures arrive much sooner on 
average after MAS armor installation than before. 
The Poisson regression model presented above uses the 
individual vehicles as blocking factors, so that it takes 
the form of a paired comparison of the before and after 
armoring states.  The model is useful for estimating change 
as a vehicle transitions from an unarmored state to an 
armored state. To obtain estimates of reliability metrics in 
these two states, under an assumption that the MTVRs in the 
analysis are like a random sample of MTVRs used in OIF, we 
fit Poisson regression models separately to the unarmored 
and armored vehicle data, omitting the vehicle serial number 
as a predictor variable. 
When the periods before and after MAS armor 
installation are separately modeled using Poisson 
regression, the following fitted model is obtained, again 
using a backward elimination procedure starting with a full 
model which includes unit, variant, and the interaction 
between unit and variant: 
0 2 2 4 4log( ) ( ... ) log(  )v v Net Milesλ β γ γ= + + + + , 
where λ  is the deadline failure rate, 0β  is the intercept, 
iγ  is the coefficient for variant iv , and  Net Miles  is the 
number of Net Miles during the before or after MAS armor 
installation time period. The fitted model coefficient 










0β  Intercept -8.776 (0.101) 
-7.931 
(0.069) 





3γ  Extended Bed -0.217 (0.251) 
-0.366 
(0.182) 





Table 18. Poisson Regression Fitted Model Coefficients for 
Before and After MAS Armor Installation Periods. Numbers in 
Parentheses are Standard Errors. 
 
The fitted model is used to produce the deadline 
failure rate for the periods before and after MAS armor 
installation, as shown in Table 19. The rate increases for 
each variant in the period after MAS armor installation, 
with the largest increase for the Standard Bed variant (133 
percent increase) and the smallest increase for the Extended 
Bed with Winch variant (35 percent increase).  Mean miles 
between deadlining failures are calculated using the 
deadline failure rate, and are shown by variant in Table 20. 
These results are similar to those presented in Figure 24. 
In the period after MAS armor installation, the Standard Bed 
variant has mean miles between deadlining failure values 
just above the 2,000 mile reliability MOE minimum, while the 
Extended Bed variant has values close to the 4,000 mile 
reliability MOE objective. A result not observed previously 
in this thesis is the different performance of variants with 
the winch assembly. For both the Standard Bed variant and 
the Extended Bed variant, the mean miles between deadlining 
failures is less for the variant with a winch. A potential 
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cause of this difference is the increased usage of variants 
with a winch, due to their ability to perform self recovery 
and recovery of HMMWVs on tactical convoys.  
 
Period Before MAS Armor 
Install



















Standard Bed 1.54 1.26 1.88 3.60 3.14 4.12
Standard Bed 
with Winch 2.51 1.84 3.41 4.51 3.44 5.91
Extended Bed 1.24 0.79 1.95 2.49 1.79 3.48
Extended Bed 
with Winch 2.10 1.33 3.30 2.83 1.70 4.70
 
Table 19. Deadline Failure Rates, Per 10,000 Net Miles, by 
Variant for the Periods Before and After MAS Armor 
Installation. 
 
Period Before MAS Armor 
Install



















Standard Bed 6478 5307 7906 2781 2430 3184
Standard Bed 
with Winch 3987 2930 5426 2219 1692 2909
Extended Bed 8044 5116 12647 4009 2873 5596
Extended Bed 
with Winch 4768 3033 7498 3539 2127 5891
 
Table 20. Mean Miles Between Deadline Failure by Variant for 
the Periods Before and After MAS Armor Installation. 
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IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The foundation of all analysis and modeling in this 
thesis is a comprehensive database of MTVR maintenance and 
supply requirements. Identification and refinement of the 
essential data elements in this database at an early stage 
was necessary to provide accurate analysis and modeling. The 
efficient processing of MDR data queries aided in creating 
the database, but improving the poor quality of MIMMS AIS 
data demanded more time than any other aspect of this thesis 
research. MIMMS AIS data is not directly suited for 
reliability analysis and modeling. This stems from the lack 
of control over user input in many of the essential data 
elements, and must be changed if future maintenance 
information systems are to be used for reliability analysis 
and modeling. Accurate data collection is the foundation of 
proper readiness reporting in the Marine Corps.  This 
understanding must expand to include data collection in 
support of reliability analysis and modeling. 
The sample size and 37 month period of observation met 
all of the thesis' analysis and modeling requirements. 
Multiple variants, units, and subsystems could not have been 
as thoroughly analyzed if a smaller sample had been taken. 
Yet care must be taken with a large sample. Vehicle 
observation start dates are managed based upon the type of 
analysis being conducted. Specifically, sample MTVRs that 
enter the period of observation at MAS armoring are not 
included in system and subsystem analysis and modeling 
because those vehicles, being new to the OIF environment, 
will degrade the accuracy of the results. Understanding the 
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limitations of the data sample and the constraints of the 
analytical methods facilitates accurate results. 
The results of operational use and performance provide 
an understanding that is further refined by non-parametric 
and parametric statistical methods. MTVR usage, measured in 
odometer miles (Net Miles), is used to capture vehicle age. 
System reliability analysis must be based upon the system's 
predominant age factor, whether it is rounds fired, hours 
operated, or miles driven. Reliability estimates are not 
useful if the appropriate age factor is not used. 
Operational analysis shows that unit MTVR usage is 
uneven. Measures that could be taken to provide better 
balance and sustainment of the OIF MTVR fleet are: 
• The logistics unit (MLG), which has the highest 
coefficient of variation for vehicle usage, should 
conduct an internal balancing of MTVRs based upon 
usage. 
• The infantry division unit (DIV), which has the 
largest quantity of MTVRs and the second highest 
mean usage, should selectively exchange MTVRs with 
the aircraft wing unit (MAW) and headquarters unit 
(MHG), which have the lowest mean usage. 
• Rotate Standard Bed MTVRs with greater than 30,000 
miles. This measure is based upon the 2,000 Mean 
Miles Between Operational Failure minimum 
reliability MOE, the Mean Miles Between Deadlining 
Failure plot and graph in Figure 23 and Figure 24, 
and the Poisson regression model output in Table 
20. 
• Rotate Extended Bed MTVRs with greater than 40,000 
miles. This measure is based upon the 2,000 Mean 
Miles Between Operational Failure minimum 
reliability MOE, the Mean Miles Between Deadlining 
Failure graph in Figure 24, and the Poisson 
regression model output in Table 20. 
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The unit MTVR usage identified in this thesis also can be 
used to refine OIF Equipment Density Lists (EDL) and 
established Tables of Organization and Equipment (TO&E). An 
alternate measure to balancing unit quantities would be to 
reduce MTVR EDL quantities in units with low usage rates. 
Similarly, future TO&E reviews can incorporate OIF usage 
rates into decisions to increase or decrease MTVR quantities 
in unit TO&Es. 
Preventive Maintenance should provide appropriate 
attention to the systems and subsystems that are generating 
the most failures. For the OIF MTVRs, the following summary 
is provided in order focus Preventive Maintenance efforts: 
• Poor or degrading reliability is a cause for 
concern in the infantry division unit (DIV) 
Standard Bed variants with MAS Cab armor, infantry 
division unit (DIV) Standard Bed variants with MAS 
Cab and Troop Carrier armor, and the AXLE/SUSP 
subsystem in Standard Bed variants with MAS Cab 
and Troop Carrier armor. 
• The subsystems that are demanding the most 
maintenance attention, excluding the BODY 
subsystem, are the AXLE/SUSP, ELEC, and ENG 
subsystems. The FUEL and COOL subsystems are also 
demanding attention based upon their high 
deadlining failure per subsystem part ratio. 
• Good reliability results are shown in the 
logistics unit (MLG) Extended Bed variants with 
MAS Cab armor, aircraft wing unit (MAW) Extended 
Bed variants with MAS Cab armor, and AXLE/SUSP 
subsystem in Extended Bed variants with MAS Cab 
armor. 
The use of the NHPP model and the HPP model must be 
carefully determined for each aspect of the system being 
analyzed (i.e., variant, subsystem). Stochastic models for 
determining equipment reliability must be periodically 
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compared with current equipment reliability data to ensure 
model assumptions are accurate. This concept applies to the 
TLCM-AT data models and simulation.  Once Verification, 
Validation, and Accreditation (VV&A) is accomplished, TLCM-
AT must be periodically compared with the actual reliability 
performance of the equipment it is modeling. This will 
sustain the accuracy of, and reliance upon, stochastic 
modeling for equipment life cycle management and assessment. 
The best application of failure rate and MTBF is over 
as small an interval as possible (e.g., monthly is better 
than yearly). In the OIF MTVR sample, the deadlining failure 
rate is higher for each variant in the period after MAS 
armor installation than in the period before MAS armor 
installation. Specifically, and as shown in Table 16 using 
the HPP with deadline failure event recurrence data, the 
percent increase for each variant is: 
• Standard Bed with MAS Cab armor: 162 percent 
• Standard Bed with MAS Cab and Troop Carrier armor: 
76 percent 
• Extended Bed with MAS Cab armor: 82 percent 
The trend of increasing deadline failure rates, and 
decreasing MTBF, is further validated in the Poisson 
regression modeling. The Poisson regression model results 
show that the MTVR cargo variant deadline failure rate is 
2.51 times higher, and the MTBF is 39.8 percent lower, in 
the period after MAS armor installation than in the period 
before MAS armor installation. Separate Poisson regression 
modeling of the periods before and after MAS armor 
installation further support these results and the results 
found throughout the thesis' analysis. To summarize these 
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results, the Standard Bed variant has the largest 
reliability degradation during the period of observation, 
and is approaching the minimum acceptable reliability MOE, 
while the Extended Bed variant has a reliability degradation 
that is acceptable within the established reliability MOEs. 
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APPENDIX A 
A. MTVR SPECIFICATIONS 
• Cargo body: 14 ft (standard bed), 20 ft (extended 
bed) 
• Curb Weight (un-armored): 27800 - 31069 lbs 
• Gross Vehicle Weight Rating: 57800 - 61178 lbs 
• Maximum speed: 65 mph 
• Self-recovery winch: 20000 lbs 
• Engine: Caterpillar C-12, 425 horsepower 
• Transmission: Allison HD4070P 7-speed automatic 
• Axles: Rockwell SVI 5MR 
• Suspension: Oshkosh TAK-4 independent suspension 
B. MTVR RELIABILITY MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS 
• Mean Miles Between Operational Failures: 2000 
miles (minimum), 4000 miles (objective) 
• Probability of completing a 200 mile mission 
without mission failure: 0.90 (minimum), 0.95 
(objective) 
• Achieved availability: 0.89 (minimum), 0.90 
(objective) 
• Mean Time To Repair (MTTR): Organizational - 3 
hours (minimum), Intermediate - 5 hours (minimum) 
• Mean Miles Between Preventive Maintenance: 1800 
miles (minimum), 3600 miles (objective) 
• Mean Time To Perform Preventive Maintenance: less 
than 3 hours 
• Maintenance Ratio (hours/operational miles): 
0.01375 (minimum), 0.011 (objective) 
• Service Life: 0.70 probability of completing 77000 
miles (minimum) during its estimated 22 year 
service life without replacement of a major 
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component, e.g., engine, transmission, cooling 
system, electrical system, etc. (objective). 
C. MTVR ARMOR SYSTEM SPECIFICATIONS 
• Weight: 10,500 lbs (cab and troop carrier) 
• Level I armor (permanent modification) 
• Integrated cab armor system 
• Armored rear troop carrier 
• Ballistic glass 
• Air conditioning system 
• Machine gun mount 
• V-shape belly pan and wheel zone deflectors 
• Upgraded front suspension 
D. MTVR SUBSYSTEMS 
• AIR: Air system and intake air assembly 
• AXLE/SUSP: Front and rear axle, suspension, wheel 
and tire group, ABS group, CTIS system, and 
steering system 
• BODY: Armor, cab, cargo body group, cargo body 
mounting group, cargo body seat group, cargo cover 
camo kit group, data plate group, frame, sheet 
metal, and troop ladder group 
• COOL: Cooling system 
• ELEC: Electrical system 
• ENG: Engine and exhaust system 
• FUEL: Fuel system 
• HYDR: Hydraulic group 
• OTHER: Bulk items, options group, and repair kits 
• TRAN: Propshaft, transfer case, and transmission 
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APPENDIX B 
SAMPLE OF ERO HISTORY DATA 
SN ID UNIT ERO SCHED LEVEL EVAC DEF SUBSYSTEM CAT DRIS DLM2 DCLOSE METER USE MTR MDD/L PRI
590817 10629A MLG HI211 N 2   K34 ELEC X 6/11/2004   8/20/2004 15823   0 5 
590817 10629A MLG HI255 N 2   N12 BODY X 9/8/2004   12/6/2004 23000   0 5 
590817 10629A MLG XRM79 Y 2   I67 BODY N 1/14/2006   3/24/2006 22185   0 12
590817 10629A MLG XRM92 Y 2   H67 ENG N 1/14/2006 3/8/2006 3/18/2006 44964 Y 53 12
590817 10629A MLG M3B22 Y 3 Y H67 BODY N 1/14/2006 3/8/2006 3/20/2006 999   0 12
590817 10629C MLG XSQ39 Y 2   I67 OTHER N 5/13/2006   5/15/2006 2673   0 12
590817 10629C MLG MR265 Y 3 Y I67 TRAN N 5/13/2006   5/15/2006 2673   0 12
590817 10629C MLG XRM07 N 2   355 OTHER N 5/23/2006 5/24/2006 5/24/2006 47665 Y 1 12
590817 10629C MLG MR328 N 3 Y 355 OTHER M 5/23/2006 5/24/2006 5/24/2006 47665 Y 0 5 
590817 10629C MLG XRL80 Y 2   52 OTHER N 5/31/2006   6/3/2006 4590   0 12
590817 10629C MLG XRP66 Y 2   H67 TRAN N 6/19/2006 6/27/2006 6/29/2006 48107 Y 8 12
590817 10629C MLG MR477 N 3 Y H34 BODY N 6/20/2006 6/21/2006 6/21/2006 48111 Y 2 12
590817 10629C MLG XRL68 N 2   M17 AIR M 10/16/2006 11/9/2006 11/9/2006 53723 Y 24 2 
590817 10629C MLG MR509 N 3 Y H04 BODY M 11/7/2006 10/16/2006 11/8/2006 53726 Y 0 2 
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APPENDIX C 
SAMPLE OF REPAIR PART DATA 
ERO DRIS DOC # PART NAME QTY PRIORITY PART $ TOTAL $ NSN UNIT ISSUESUBSYSTEM 
IQI51 7002 9420170027365 SEAL,PLAIN 4 5 25.33 101.32 5330015179793 EA AXLE/SUSP
IQI51 7002 9420170027366 RING,RETAI 4 5 1.77 7.08 5325014792006 EA AXLE/SUSP
IQI51 7002 9420170027367 O-RING 4 5 0.54 2.16 5331014789898 EA AXLE/SUSP
IQI52 7002 9420170057102 PLATE,MOUN 1 5 76 76 5340015356438 EA BODY 
IQI52 7002 9420170027370 PLATE,MOUN 1 5 76 76 5340015356445 EA BODY 
IQI52 7002 9420170027369 LOCKING PL 1 12 126.73 126.73 5340015361482 EA BODY 
IQI52 7002 9420170317601 PARTS KIT, 1 12 14.25 14.25 2590013081624 KT BODY 
PSX54 7002 SAL1270487053 FSTOCKFFF 1 2 15003.98 15003.98 5998014455564 EA TRAN 
PSX54 7002 SAL1270457051 FSTOCKFFF 1 2 11479.25 11479.25 1005011918733 EA TRAN 
PSX54 7002 SAL1270027050 FSTOCKFFF 1 2 2255.25 2255.25 2920013786775 EA TRAN 
PSX54 7002 9442070027C09 ANNUNCIATO 1 5 3103.28 3103.28 6350014958700 EA OTHER 
PSX54 7002 9442070027C02 HANDLE,SOC 1 12 35.21 35.21 5120000998544 EA BODY 
PSX54 7002 9442070027C06 WRENCH,BOX 1 12 12.25 12.25 5120013491438 EA OTHER 
PSX54 7002 9442070027C07 WRENCH,BOX 1 12 12.25 12.25 5120013491439 EA OTHER 
PSX54 7002 9442070027C05 SOCKET,SOC 1 12 4.98 4.98 5120001801016 EA OTHER 
PSX54 7002 9442070027C08 WRENCH,BOX 1 12 4.88 4.88 5120010454907 EA OTHER 
PSX54 7002 9442070027C03 SOCKET,SOC 1 12 4.86 4.86 5120013489133 EA OTHER 
PSX54 7002 9442070027C04 SOCKET,SOC 1 12 4.86 4.86 5120013489134 EA OTHER 
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APPENDIX D 
ESSENTIAL DATA ELEMENTS 
• Armor type: The type of MAS armor kit installed, 
described as either cab or cab and troop carrier. 
• Armoring date: The date that MAS armor is 
installed. 
• Category Code: A code that identifies the type of 
equipment inducted into maintenance and the 
criticality of repair. 
• Date Received In Shop (DRIS): The date that a 
vehicle is inducted into maintenance. 
• Date LM2: The date that a deadlined vehicle is 
removed from deadlined status. 
• Defect Code: A code used to identify the specific 
problem with the vehicle inducted for repair. 
• Equipment Repair Order (ERO): The document that 
captures maintenance actions and requirements when 
a vehicle is inducted into maintenance. 
• ERO Cross Reference: The ERO that an active ERO is 
associated to.  Used when a vehicle is evacuated 
to a higher echelon of maintenance. 
• ID Number:  The variant or model of the vehicle. 
• "M" Days Deadlined: The number of days a vehicle 
is in deadlined status (Category Code "M"). 
• Meter: The odometer reading at the time a vehicle 
is inducted into maintenance. 
• National Stock Number (NSN): The stock number used 
to categorize, identify, requisition, and track 
system parts. 
• Priority: The two digit numeric value that 
identifies the urgency of need for repair or 
repair parts. 
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• Required Delivery Date (RDD): The date that the 
vehicle manufacturer is required to provide the 
vehicle to the using unit. 
• Scheduled / unscheduled maintenance: The broad 
type of maintenance a vehicle requires when an ERO 
is created. Scheduled maintenance is normally for 
preventive maintenance and planned modifications, 
while unscheduled maintenance is for corrective 
maintenance due to system failure. 
• Serial number: The vehicle serial number. 
• Subsystem: The vehicle subsystem that identifies 
the location of failure and required maintenance. 
• Unit Identification Code (UIC): The five digit 
code that identifies the unit a vehicle is 
assigned to. 
• Unit: The major Marine Corps operating force unit 









Explanation (2nd & 3rd 
characters) Subsystem Sched. Freq.
2 Test Equ./Display Devices   OTHER N 2 
11   Hose, Tubing, Fittings OTHER N 1 
17   Pumps and Components OTHER N 1 
22   Steering Components AXLE/SUSP N 1 
25   Glass Replacement BODY N 1 
34   Replace OTHER N 40 
48   Cracked, Broken, Bent BODY N 8 
52   Annual Preventive Maint.   Y 402 
53   Semiannual Preventive Maint.   Y 25 
54   Not Applicable OTHER N 4 
55   Inoperative OTHER N 1 
56   Minor   N 203 
57   Adjust OTHER N 7 
61   Starter ELEC N 2 
64   SL-3 Application BODY Y 473 
66   Fabrication OTHER Y 2 
67   Modification Application BODY Y 75 
69   Unknown OTHER N 1 
113 Ancillary Equipment/Wiring Injector Systems FUEL N 1 
234 Test Equ./Display Devices Replace OTHER N 7 
254 Test Equ./Display Devices Not Applicable OTHER N 1 
255 Test Equ./Display Devices Inoperative OTHER N 1 
311 Air Conditioners Hose, Tubing, Fittings OTHER N 2 
317 Air Conditioners Pumps and Components OTHER N 7 
322 Air Conditioners Steering Components AXLE/SUSP N 1 
327 Air Conditioners Unknown OTHER N 8 
334 Air Conditioners Replace OTHER N 15 
348 Air Conditioners Cracked, Broken, Bent OTHER N 9 
350 Air Conditioners Components Out of Tolerance OTHER N 2 
354 Air Conditioners Not Applicable OTHER N 2 
355 Air Conditioners Inoperative OTHER N 67 
356 Air Conditioners Minor OTHER N 3 
357 Air Conditioners Adjust OTHER N 3 
358 Air Conditioners Moisture Found OTHER N 2 
360 Air Conditioners Safety Deadline OTHER N 1 
367 Air Conditioners Modification Application OTHER Y 2 
371 Air Conditioners Unknown OTHER N 1 
402 Component Brake System AXLE/SUSP N 2 






Explanation (2nd & 3rd 
characters) Subsystem Sched. Freq.
433 Component High Voltage Wave Ratio ELEC N 2 
434 Component Replace OTHER N 90 
448 Component Cracked, Broken, Bent OTHER N 3 
452 Component Annual Preventive Maint. OTHER Y 6 
455 Component Inoperative OTHER N 4 
456 Component Minor OTHER N 6 
457 Component Adjust OTHER N 1 
463 Component Exhaust System ENG N 1 
464 Component SL-3 Application OTHER Y 4 
466 Component Fabrication OTHER Y 3 
467 Component Modification Application OTHER Y 6 
634 Canvas Replace OTHER N 8 
A01 Engine Alternator, Generator ELEC N 2 
A07 Engine Cylinders, Accumulators ENG N 2 
A11 Engine Hose, Tubing, Fittings ENG N 4 
A13 Engine Injector Systems FUEL N 6 
A14 Engine Mechanical Drive Systems ENG N 8 
A16 Engine Packing, Seals, Gaskets ENG N 10 
A17 Engine Pumps and Components ENG N 1 
A19 Engine Regulator Mechanisms ENG N 1 
A21 Engine Torque, Sprocket, Drive Mech. ENG N 3 
A22 Engine Steering Components AXLE/SUSP N 1 
A27 Engine Unknown ENG N 7 
A31 Engine Overhaul ENG N 1 
A34 Engine Replace ENG N 35 
A41 Engine Shorted/Low Resistive Circuitry ELEC N 1 
A42 Engine Mechanical/Linkage or Drive ENG N 1 
A48 Engine Cracked, Broken, Bent ENG N 10 
A50 Engine Components Out of Tolerance ENG N 2 
A55 Engine Inoperative ENG N 7 
A56 Engine Minor ENG N 3 
A57 Engine Adjust ENG N 1 
A61 Engine Starter ELEC N 6 
A63 Engine Exhaust System ENG N 7 
A67 Engine Modification Application ENG Y 5 
B04 Transmission Carriage & Mount TRAN N 1 
B06 Transmission Control Mechanisms TRAN N 3 
B11 Transmission Hose, Tubing, Fittings TRAN N 10 
B14 Transmission Mechanical Drive Systems TRAN N 3 
B16 Transmission Packing, Seals, Gaskets TRAN N 12 
B17 Transmission Pumps and Components TRAN N 1 
B21 Transmission Torque, Sprocket, Drive Mech. TRAN N 2 
B27 Transmission Unknown TRAN N 6 
B34 Transmission Replace TRAN N 34 






Explanation (2nd & 3rd 
characters) Subsystem Sched. Freq.
B48 Transmission Cracked, Broken, Bent TRAN N 10 
B50 Transmission Components Out of Tolerance TRAN N 1 
B52 Transmission Annual Preventive Maint. TRAN Y 13 
B55 Transmission Inoperative TRAN N 25 
B56 Transmission Minor TRAN N 9 
B57 Transmission Adjust TRAN N 1 
B60 Transmission Safety Deadline TRAN N 1 
B64 Transmission SL-3 Application TRAN Y 14 
B67 Transmission Modification Application TRAN Y 1 
C11 Power Pack Hose, Tubing, Fittings ENG N 2 
C12 Power Pack Housing and Castings ENG N 2 
C16 Power Pack Packing, Seals, Gaskets ENG N 3 
C34 Power Pack Replace ENG N 1 
C48 Power Pack Cracked, Broken, Bent ENG N 1 
D02 Power Train Brake System AXLE/SUSP N 1 
D06 Power Train Control Mechanisms TRAN N 1 
D11 Power Train Hose, Tubing, Fittings TRAN N 1 
D14 Power Train Mechanical Drive Systems TRAN N 7 
D16 Power Train Packing, Seals, Gaskets TRAN N 21 
D17 Power Train Pumps and Components TRAN N 2 
D21 Power Train Torque, Sprocket, Drive Mech. TRAN N 3 
D22 Power Train Steering Components AXLE/SUSP N 2 
D34 Power Train Replace TRAN N 12 
D48 Power Train Cracked, Broken, Bent TRAN N 7 
D52 Power Train Annual Preventive Maint. TRAN Y 1 
D58 Power Train Moisture Found TRAN N 1 
E01 Axle System Alternator, Generator AXLE/SUSP N 1 
E02 Axle System Brake System AXLE/SUSP N 44 
E06 Axle System Control Mechanisms AXLE/SUSP N 2 
E11 Axle System Hose, Tubing, Fittings AXLE/SUSP N 3 
E12 Axle System Housing and Castings AXLE/SUSP N 5 
E14 Axle System Mechanical Drive Systems AXLE/SUSP N 5 
E16 Axle System Packing, Seals, Gaskets AXLE/SUSP N 172 
E17 Axle System Pumps and Components AXLE/SUSP N 2 
E20 Axle System Springs, Shocks, Stabilizer AXLE/SUSP N 19 
E21 Axle System Torque, Sprocket, Drive Mech. AXLE/SUSP N 2 
E22 Axle System Steering Components AXLE/SUSP N 32 
E23 Axle System Valves and Valve Components AXLE/SUSP N 1 
E24 Axle System Torsion Components AXLE/SUSP N 1 
E27 Axle System Unknown AXLE/SUSP N 1 
E31 Axle System Overhaul AXLE/SUSP N 2 
E34 Axle System Replace AXLE/SUSP N 139 
E44 Axle System System Alignment AXLE/SUSP N 1 
E48 Axle System Cracked, Broken, Bent AXLE/SUSP N 22 






Explanation (2nd & 3rd 
characters) Subsystem Sched. Freq.
E55 Axle System Inoperative AXLE/SUSP N 1 
E56 Axle System Minor AXLE/SUSP N 2 
E58 Axle System Moisture Found AXLE/SUSP N 27 
E65 Axle System Sewing Rips/Torn Areas AXLE/SUSP N 1 
E66 Axle System Fabrication AXLE/SUSP Y 1 
E67 Axle System Modification Application AXLE/SUSP Y 15 
F02 Suspension System Brake System AXLE/SUSP N 3 
F11 Suspension System Hose, Tubing, Fittings AXLE/SUSP N 1 
F12 Suspension System Housing and Castings AXLE/SUSP N 2 
F16 Suspension System Packing, Seals, Gaskets AXLE/SUSP N 27 
F20 Suspension System Springs, Shocks, Stabilizer AXLE/SUSP N 41 
F22 Suspension System Steering Components AXLE/SUSP N 21 
F24 Suspension System Torsion Components AXLE/SUSP N 1 
F34 Suspension System Replace AXLE/SUSP N 28 
F48 Suspension System Cracked, Broken, Bent AXLE/SUSP N 19 
F67 Suspension System Modification Application AXLE/SUSP Y 1 
H01 Body, Frame, Hull Alternator, Generator ELEC N 1 
H02 Body, Frame, Hull Brake System AXLE/SUSP N 2 
H04 Body, Frame, Hull Carriage & Mount BODY N 29 
H10 Body, Frame, Hull Gun Tube, Breech, Firing Mech. BODY N 3 
H11 Body, Frame, Hull Hose, Tubing, Fittings BODY N 2 
H12 Body, Frame, Hull Housing and Castings BODY N 1 
H16 Body, Frame, Hull Packing, Seals, Gaskets BODY N 3 
H20 Body, Frame, Hull Springs, Shocks, Stabilizer AXLE/SUSP N 17 
H22 Body, Frame, Hull Steering Components AXLE/SUSP N 2 
H24 Body, Frame, Hull Torsion Components BODY N 1 
H25 Body, Frame, Hull Glass Replacement BODY N 30 
H26 Body, Frame, Hull Painting, Body Work BODY N 1 
H27 Body, Frame, Hull Unknown BODY N 4 
H31 Body, Frame, Hull Overhaul BODY Y 4 
H34 Body, Frame, Hull Replace BODY N 243 
H36 Body, Frame, Hull Subassembly Adjustment BODY N 2 
H42 Body, Frame, Hull Mechanical/Linkage or Drive BODY N 3 
H46 Body, Frame, Hull Low Voltage Power Supply ELEC N 1 
H48 Body, Frame, Hull Cracked, Broken, Bent BODY N 109 
H50 Body, Frame, Hull Components Out of Tolerance BODY N 15 
H55 Body, Frame, Hull Inoperative BODY N 8 
H56 Body, Frame, Hull Minor BODY N 62 
H57 Body, Frame, Hull Adjust BODY N 9 
H59 Body, Frame, Hull Arcing/Burnt Components BODY N 4 
H60 Body, Frame, Hull Safety Deadline BODY N 2 
H61 Body, Frame, Hull Starter ELEC N 1 
H63 Body, Frame, Hull Exhaust System ENG N 2 
H64 Body, Frame, Hull SL-3 Application BODY Y 1 






Explanation (2nd & 3rd 
characters) Subsystem Sched. Freq.
H66 Body, Frame, Hull Fabrication BODY Y 2 
H67 Body, Frame, Hull Modification Application BODY Y 675 
I16 Armament Packing, Seals, Gaskets BODY N 1 
I25 Armament Glass Replacement BODY N 4 
I26 Armament Painting, Body Work BODY N 1 
I34 Armament Replace BODY N 24 
I48 Armament Cracked, Broken, Bent BODY N 4 
I55 Armament Inoperative BODY N 2 
I57 Armament Adjust BODY N 2 
I60 Armament Safety Deadline BODY N 4 
I66 Armament Fabrication BODY Y 6 
I67 Armament Modification Application BODY Y 181 
J04 Cooling System Carriage & Mount COOL N 1 
J08 Cooling System Distribution Systems COOL N 1 
J11 Cooling System Hose, Tubing, Fittings COOL N 9 
J12 Cooling System Housing and Castings COOL N 1 
J13 Cooling System Injector Systems COOL N 1 
J16 Cooling System Packing, Seals, Gaskets COOL N 6 
J17 Cooling System Pumps and Components COOL N 4 
J27 Cooling System Unknown COOL N 8 
J34 Cooling System Replace COOL N 17 
J48 Cooling System Cracked, Broken, Bent COOL N 4 
J50 Cooling System Components Out of Tolerance COOL N 2 
J55 Cooling System Inoperative COOL N 3 
J57 Cooling System Adjust COOL N 2 
J58 Cooling System Moisture Found COOL N 1 
J67 Cooling System Modification Application COOL Y 3 
K01 Electrical System Alternator, Generator ELEC N 19 
K02 Electrical System Brake System AXLE/SUSP N 13 
K04 Electrical System Carriage & Mount ELEC N 1 
K06 Electrical System Control Mechanisms ELEC N 8 
K12 Electrical System Housing and Castings ELEC N 1 
K14 Electrical System Mechanical Drive Systems ELEC N 1 
K16 Electrical System Packing, Seals, Gaskets ELEC N 1 
K17 Electrical System Pumps and Components ELEC N 2 
K19 Electrical System Regulator Mechanisms ELEC N 5 
K22 Electrical System Steering Components ELEC N 1 
K27 Electrical System Unknown ELEC N 26 
K31 Electrical System Overhaul ELEC N 2 
K32 Electrical System Reflected Power ELEC N 1 
K34 Electrical System Replace ELEC N 172 
K38 Electrical System Low Power Out ELEC N 1 
K39 Electrical System Corroded/Rusted ELEC N 1 
K40 Electrical System Open/High Resistive Circuitry ELEC N 1 






Explanation (2nd & 3rd 
characters) Subsystem Sched. Freq.
K46 Electrical System Low Voltage Power Supply ELEC N 5 
K48 Electrical System Cracked, Broken, Bent ELEC N 7 
K54 Electrical System Not Applicable ELEC N 1 
K55 Electrical System Inoperative ELEC N 76 
K56 Electrical System Minor ELEC N 15 
K57 Electrical System Adjust ELEC N 10 
K59 Electrical System Arcing/Burnt Components ELEC N 5 
K60 Electrical System Safety Deadline ELEC N 5 
K61 Electrical System Starter ELEC N 27 
K62 Electrical System Battery ELEC N 16 
K64 Electrical System SL-3 Application ELEC Y 4 
K67 Electrical System Modification Application ELEC Y 31 
L05 Fuel System Clutch, Converter, Couplings FUEL N 1 
L07 Fuel System Cylinders, Accumulators FUEL N 1 
L11 Fuel System Hose, Tubing, Fittings FUEL N 2 
L12 Fuel System Housing and Castings FUEL N 1 
L13 Fuel System Injector Systems FUEL N 2 
L16 Fuel System Packing, Seals, Gaskets FUEL N 8 
L17 Fuel System Pumps and Components FUEL N 2 
L27 Fuel System Unknown FUEL N 1 
L34 Fuel System Replace FUEL N 14 
L48 Fuel System Cracked, Broken, Bent FUEL N 6 
L55 Fuel System Inoperative FUEL N 2 
L56 Fuel System Minor FUEL N 1 
L63 Fuel System Exhaust System ENG N 1 
M02 Hydraulic System Brake System HYDR N 6 
M06 Hydraulic System Control Mechanisms HYDR N 1 
M11 Hydraulic System Hose, Tubing, Fittings HYDR N 5 
M12 Hydraulic System Housing and Castings HYDR N 1 
M16 Hydraulic System Packing, Seals, Gaskets HYDR N 3 
M17 Hydraulic System Pumps and Components HYDR N 2 
M22 Hydraulic System Steering Components HYDR N 10 
M23 Hydraulic System Valves and Valve Components HYDR N 2 
M27 Hydraulic System Unknown HYDR N 1 
M34 Hydraulic System Replace HYDR N 7 
M48 Hydraulic System Cracked, Broken, Bent HYDR N 2 
M50 Hydraulic System Components Out of Tolerance HYDR N 1 
M55 Hydraulic System Inoperative HYDR N 1 
N02 Air System Brake System AIR N 35 
N06 Air System Control Mechanisms AIR N 2 
N11 Air System Hose, Tubing, Fittings AIR N 41 
N12 Air System Housing and Castings AIR N 3 
N16 Air System Packing, Seals, Gaskets AIR N 10 
N17 Air System Pumps and Components AIR N 2 






Explanation (2nd & 3rd 
characters) Subsystem Sched. Freq.
N23 Air System Valves and Valve Components AIR N 11 
N27 Air System Unknown AIR N 12 
N29 Air System Abuse/Unauthorized Maint. AIR N 1 
N34 Air System Replace AIR N 53 
N41 Air System Shorted/Low Resistive Circuitry AIR N 5 
N48 Air System Cracked, Broken, Bent AIR N 14 
N50 Air System Components Out of Tolerance AIR N 2 
N55 Air System Inoperative AIR N 14 
N56 Air System Minor AIR N 2 
O04 Turret System Carriage & Mount BODY N 1 
O16 Turret System Packing, Seals, Gaskets BODY N 1 
O31 Turret System Overhaul BODY Y 7 
O34 Turret System Replace BODY N 24 
O48 Turret System Cracked, Broken, Bent BODY N 1 
O55 Turret System Inoperative BODY N 1 
O66 Turret System Fabrication BODY Y 8 
O67 Turret System Modification Application BODY Y 150 
P23 Fire Control System Valves and Valve Components OTHER N 1 
Q27 Ignition System Unknown ELEC N 2 
Q34 Ignition System Replace ELEC N 3 
Q41 Ignition System Shorted/Low Resistive Circuitry ELEC N 1 
Q55 Ignition System Inoperative ELEC N 4 
Q56 Ignition System Minor ELEC N 1 
Q59 Ignition System Arcing/Burnt Components ELEC N 1 
Q61 Ignition System Starter ELEC N 2 
R11 Boom, Cable, Lift System Hose, Tubing, Fittings OTHER N 1 
R23 Boom, Cable, Lift System Valves and Valve Components OTHER N 1 
R29 Boom, Cable, Lift System Abuse/Unauthorized Maint. OTHER N 1 
R34 Boom, Cable, Lift System Replace OTHER N 5 
R37 Boom, Cable, Lift System Cabling Malfunction OTHER N 1 
R55 Boom, Cable, Lift System Inoperative OTHER N 1 
R56 Boom, Cable, Lift System Minor OTHER N 1 
T16 Receiver/Input Circuitry Packing, Seals, Gaskets OTHER N 1 
T67 Receiver/Input Circuitry Modification Application OTHER Y 2 
U11 Antenna/Transmission Line Hose, Tubing, Fittings OTHER N 1 
U34 Antenna/Transmission Line Replace OTHER N 5 
U56 Antenna/Transmission Line Minor OTHER N 5 
U67 Antenna/Transmission Line Modification Application OTHER Y 8 
W50 Data/Digital Systems Components Out of Tolerance OTHER N 1 
WIR WIR WIR   N 22 
X34 Meter Replace OTHER N 2 
X55 Meter Inoperative OTHER N 1 
X67 Meter Modification Application OTHER Y 1 
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APPENDIX F 
ADDITIONAL MEAN CUMULATIVE FUNCTION PLOTS 
• AIR subsystem failures MCF plot: 












































• BODY subsystem failures MCF plot: 























• COOL subsystem failures MCF plot: 























• ELEC subsystem failures MCF plot: 






















• ENG subsystem failures MCF plot: 























• FUEL subsystem failures MCF plot: 
























• HYDR subsystem failures MCF plot: 


























• OTHER subsystem failures MCF plot: 

























• TRAN subsystem failures MCF plot: 
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APPENDIX G 
MEAN TIME BETWEEN FAILURE DERIVATION 
For a system at time t , the expected time to its next 
failure is given by  
0
( ) ( , ) ,t R u t duµ ∞= ∫  
where ( , ) ( )R u t P X t u= > +  is the reliability function of the 
system at time t .  The reliability function can be expressed 
as  
( , ) exp ( , )
t u
t
R u t r t drυ+⎡ ⎤= −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦∫ , 
where ( , )r tυ  is the failure rate.  If ( , )r tυ  is a constant for 
all values of r and t , failure arrivals follow a homogeneous 
Poisson process (HPP).  Equivalently, the times between 
failure events follow an exponential distribution.  In this 
case repairs are completely effective in returning the 
system to “as new” condition.  A HPP is the most common 
example of a renewal process, although not every renewal 
process is a HPP. 
 Many repairable systems degrade as they age, so that 
the arrival rate of failures increases with time.  This is 
often described using a nonhomogeneous Poisson process 
(NHPP) with an increasing rate of arrivals, such as the 
following Power Law model: 
1
( , ) rr t
ββυ η η
−⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠  
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A Power Law model has an increasing rate of failures if β  
is greater than one.  In this model there is no dependence 
on t , which suggests that repair returns the system to the 
condition it was in just before failure occurred. 
 For a Power Law model the mean time to repair starting 




t u tr t dr
β β
υ η η
+ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞+= −⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠∫  
0
0
( ) ( , ) exp exp
1       1 exp





η β η η
∞∞ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞+= = −⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤ ⎧ ⎫⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎪ ⎪= Γ + >⎢ ⎥ ⎨ ⎬⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎢ ⎥ ⎪ ⎪⎣ ⎦ ⎩ ⎭
∫ ∫
 
where G  is a random variable having a standard gamma 
distribution with shape parameter 1/ β . 
 
 95
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
Fort Belvoir, Virginia  
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California  
 
3. Marine Corps Representative 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 
 
4. Director, Training and Education, MCCDC, Code C46 
Quantico, Virginia 
 




6. Marine Corps Tactical Systems Support Activity (Attn: 
Operations Officer) 
Camp, Pendleton, California 
 




8. Head, Logistics Operations Analysis Section, 
Installations and Logistics Department, HQMC 
Washington, District of Columbia 
 




10. Program Officer, Medium Fleet, Motor Transportation, 
Marine Corps Systems Command 
Quantico, Virginia 
 
11. Head, Capability Assessment Support Center, Marine 




12. Project Manager, Total Life Cycle Management - 
Assessment Tool (TLCM-AT), Clockwork Solutions, Austin, 
Texas 
 
